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ABSTRACT 
ILLUSORY JUDGMENTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY: 
REASONING ERRORS RELATED TO 
PARANORMAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
by Erin C. Goforth 
University of New Hampshire, May 2008 
This research examined the predictors of illusory judgments of prediction 
under conditions of uncertainty. Study 1 investigated the believability of an 
experimental manipulation that required participants to choose a strategy for 
target object selection. Study 2 expanded upon Study 1 by giving participants an 
additional choice strategy (e.g., a computer's selection). In both Study 1 and 
Study 2, participants relied on the paranormal strategy (e.g., a psychic) to a 
greater degree under conditions of uncertainty than under conditions of certainty. 
Study 3 replicated these results using a between subjects design but also 
expanded upon Study 1 and 2 by examining individual difference and 
demographic predictors of paranormal strategy selection under conditions of 
uncertainty. Paranormal involvement and religious involvement were also 
analyzed. In Study 3, participants who chose the psychic more often were also 
more likely to overestimate the probability of correctly locating a hidden object. 
These results are discussed in terms of illusory prediction. Personal paranormal 
involvement and religious involvement were associated with less reliance on the 
psychic strategy, whereas general paranormal involvement was associated with 
X 
greater reliance on the psychic strategy. Implications for this research include a 
possible increased predilection for gambling based upon personal paranormal 
beliefs. Further, this research indicates that individuals with high paranormal 
beliefs may be vulnerable toward psychic services during times of uncertainty. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The great philosophers in sociology, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, 
theorized that as societies became modernized they would become more 
complex and rational. As a result of this "modernization", non-scientific beliefs 
such as religion and belief in the paranormal would eventually disappear (see 
Berger, 2008 for a discussion). Contrary to secularization theory, even educated 
people in the 21st century still hold non-scientific beliefs. In the United States, an 
estimated 50% of Americans believe in extrasensory perception (as cited in 
Wiseman & Watt, 2006) and more than 90% of Americans believe in at least one 
paranormal phenomenon (Gallup, 1997). In the religious realm of beliefs, nearly 
44% of Americans would classify themselves as frequent church attendees 
(Gallup, 2007) and 77% believe in Heaven, 63% believe in Hell, and 58% believe 
in the Devil (General Social Survey, 2004). 
An extensive line of paranormal and religious research has been 
conducted investigating the differences between believers and non-believers 
including differences in cognitive ability (Gray & Mill, 1990; Irwin, 1993; Musch & 
Ehrenberg, 2002), reasoning (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove, French, 
& Jones, 2006; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 
2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985)), and individual differences 
(Allen & Lester, 1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Singer & 
Benassi, 1981; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Under the broad framework of illusory 
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judgment, many researchers have looked at paranormal and religious beliefs 
from an illusion of control viewpoint (Brugger et al., 1990; Irwin, 1993; Rudski, 
2004); however, the focus of this research is to examine paranormal and 
religious beliefs from an illusion of prediction viewpoint (see Presson & Benassi, 
1996). The relation between illusion of prediction and paranormal/religious beliefs 
was explored in this research using an online experimental paradigm. The 
investigation begins with a study that explores participants' reliance on a psychic 
in a subjective probability card-guessing task. The second study explores 
whether participants will take advantage of a third choice under conditions of 
uncertainty in prediction. The focus of the research broadens in the third study, 
which examines the individual differences that may predict why some participants 
rely on the selections of a psychic when trying to predict the correct target. 
The primary goal of this research was to evaluate the predictors of psychic 
selection under conditions of uncertainty based upon subjective probabilities of 
success. It was hypothesized that individuals who held more "self 
paranormal/religious beliefs such as believing that they actually had paranormal 
ability, or those who were behaviorally involved in their beliefs (i.e., performing 
psychic services or regularly attending church), would rely less on the psychic 
under conditions of uncertainty. A secondary goal of this research was to 
determine whether an online sample would support past research findings 
concerning gender, age (including differences between college students and a 
more diverse sample of older participants), and the link between religious and 
paranormal beliefs. 
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The following literature review begins with the definitions of the 
paranormal construct in psychology. Theoretical conceptualizations regarding the 
origins and bases of paranormal beliefs will also be examined such as the 
cognitive deficit hypothesis (see Irwin, 1993) and the cognitive-experiential self-
theory (see Epstein, 1990) including intuitive versus analytical reasoning 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Due to the goals and rationale for this research, a 
large portion of the theoretical review will examine illusion of control research 
conducted in the area and the misjudgment of randomness/prediction research. 
The introduction will end by examining religious beliefs including theoretical 
explanations for paranormal beliefs as a function of religion. 
Definitions of the Paranormal Construct 
Defining and conceptualizing paranormal beliefs is a complicated process. 
Many researchers now agree that paranormal beliefs are representative of a 
multidimensional construct including such factors as witchcraft, superstition, 
traditional religious beliefs, and spiritualism (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), although 
researchers do not necessarily agree upon how many or which factors constitute 
paranormal beliefs (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). 
Another complicating factor in the paranormal field of research is the 
confusion of superstition, magical thinking, and paranormal beliefs into one or 
more separate constructs. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) claimed that paranormal 
beliefs should include superstitions, whereas Brugger and Graves (1997) argued 
that paranormal beliefs are the same construct as magical thinking. Further, 
there has not been a general agreement by researchers as to which beliefs are 
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superstitious and which are paranormal or related to magical thinking. It seems 
that a reasonable conceptualization of superstitious versus paranormal beliefs 
might relate to chance events versus behavioral events. Superstition can be 
attributed to folklore usually dealing with luck such as throwing salt over one's 
shoulder to ward off bad luck and evil spirits. Paranormal phenomena, on the 
other hand, includes unlikely behaviors and actions (i.e. telepathy and 
psychokinesis) that would bring about some result that defies science (Broad, 
1949; Goode, 2000). 
Definitions of paranormal beliefs have also varied. Literally, the Latin prefix 
"para" means "outside o f or "beyond" (Goode, 2000). Technically, something 
that is paranormal is anything that is not normal. In other words, paranormal 
events are those that cannot be explained by scientific laws or natural forces 
(Goode, 2000). Paranormal refers both to phenomena (events or abilities) and to 
beliefs (that the events actually occurred) (Goode, 2000). According to the basic 
limiting principle definition (the definition used by many parapsychological 
researchers), paranormal beliefs, if true, would violate the basic limiting principles 
of science (Broad, 1949; Tobacyk & Milford, 1984). This definition, however, 
does not differentiate wholly between paranormal, superstitious, or magical 
beliefs and does not account for other unfounded beliefs that could potentially fit 
under such a broad conceptualization (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). A more narrow 
definition of the paranormal suggests that such phenomena are scientifically 
inconceivable processes or domains outside the realm of human capabilities 
(Irwin, 1993). Lawrence (1995) further suggested that this definition include a 
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dependence on psi phenomena as the core of paranormal belief. Therefore, the 
definition used in this dissertation operationalizes paranormal beliefs as beliefs in 
psi phenomena, which violate scientifically conceivable processes and lie outside 
the realm of human capabilities (Irwin, 1993; Lawrence, 1995). 
The following alleged abilities are commonly referred to as "psi" (mind-to-
matter and mind-to-mind influence or communication) (Goode, 2000): telepathy 
(mind-to-mind communication), clairvoyance (remote viewing without the aid of 
technology), precognition (seeing the future), and psychokinesis (the ability to 
move objects with one's mind) (Goode, 2000). If psychokinesis is excluded, then 
these abilities are sometimes referred to as ESP (extrasensory perception). ESP 
is the "apparent ability to receive information via a channel of communication not 
presently recognized by mainstream science" (Wiseman & Watts, 2006, p. 324). 
Belief in paranormal abilities may be manifested in several cognitive forms 
including self-belief, other-belief, and general-belief. First, individuals may believe 
that they have such abilities (i.e., "I am able to predict future events before they 
occur"). Second, they may believe that others have these abilities (i.e., "Some 
people have the ability to move objects with their minds"). Finally, they may 
believe that such abilities exist in general (i.e., "I believe in the existence of 
ESP"). 
Theoretical Explanations for Belief in the Paranormal 
Researchers have postulated multiple theories to account for paranormal 
beliefs. First, several researchers have speculated that societal influences result 
in an emergence of paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 1993). For example, life 
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experiences may be important predictors of paranormal beliefs especially if 
family and authority figures hold positive views of paranormal phenomena 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Vyse, 1997). Media experiences may also play a role 
in the structure of paranormal beliefs (Singer & Benassi, 1981). In fact, 
individuals high in paranormal beliefs read more material and watch more 
television with paranormal themes than nonbelievers (Auton, Pope, & Seeger, 
2003). 
Perhaps more important than societal influences and knowledge gained in 
childhood from family is the role of psychological attributes in the formation and 
maintenance of paranormal beliefs. Researchers have examined numerous 
psychological functions related to paranormal belief endorsement including 
cognitive-experiential theory and human information processing regarding 
intuitive versus rational logic (Epstein, 1990; King, Burton, Hicks & Drigotas, 
2007), and cognitive deficits including illusory judgments of control (Brugger et 
al., 1990; Irwin, 1993; Presson & Benassi, 2003; Rudski, 2004) and prediction 
(Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore, 
1995; Sutherland, 1992). 
Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is based on a dual-process 
theory of cognition. CEST maintains that information can be processed from both 
an experiential (i.e., emotional) and a rational mode (Epstein, 1990). The 
experiential system is automatic, fast, and linked to the use of heuristics in 
judgments (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1998). On the other hand, the 
rational system is effortful, logical, and analytical (Epstein, 1990; King et al., 
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2007). Individuals high in paranormal beliefs rely more on the intuitive emotional 
system for processing rather than the analytical rational system (Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2006). Furthermore, high believers are those who have perceived 
experiences of paranormal phenomena and reliance on the experiential/intuitive 
system to process subsequent paranormal information has caused them to label 
these events as valid (King et al., 2007). In a study where participants were 
asked to watch several videos purporting to show ghosts or UFOs, the interaction 
between intuition (experiential processing) and positive affect significantly 
predicted whether seeing became believing (i.e., participants with more positive 
affect were more likely to believe the videos actually showed paranormal or 
magical phenomena) (King et al., 2007). Results from a study conducted by 
Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) support the dual process theory of paranormal 
beliefs; intuitive thinkers more strongly endorsed paranormal beliefs in their study 
than did analytical thinkers. 
Dual-processing theory is related to another line of theoretical research 
regarding paranormal beliefs. High paranormal believers who rely more on the 
emotional experiential system are more fixed on monitoring perceived threats in 
the environment (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Paranormal beliefs might then serve 
as a cognitive defense against such uncontrollable and potentially threatening 
events (Irwin, 1993). The endorsement of paranormal belief serves as an illusion 
of control (Irwin, 1993). Irwin (1993) described the relation between paranormal 
beliefs and the need for control by stating that paranormal beliefs lend to make 
more salient the occurrence of anomalous and uncontrollable events in the 
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individual's life" (p. 28). A review of the relation between illusory judgment, 
including illusion of control and illusion of prediction (as well as the cognitive 
deficit hypothesis), and paranormal beliefs is discussed below. 
Illusory Judgments: Control 
One type of illusory judgment is the illusion of control. Control refers to the 
attainment (actual or perceived) of a desired goal (Skinner, 1996). When 
discussing control, it is important to differentiate between actual control 
(objective) and perceived control (subjective). Actual control is defined as the 
extent of control actually present as indicated by a, "normatively appropriate 
assessment of the action-outcome relationship" (Skinner, 1985, p. 40). In the 
study of control, however, it is generally the concept of perceived control that has 
received the most attention. Perceived control is defined as, "the amount of 
control perceived by the individual either in a specific situation or on the 
aggregate (generalized) level" (Skinner, 1985, p. 40). It is clear from Skinner's 
definition that perceived control can be either task-specific or generalized. In 
addition to actual and perceived control, individuals also may have specific 
feelings while interacting with the environment in order to produce or avoid some 
outcome; these feelings are collectively referred to as experiences of control 
(Skinner, 1996). Experiences of control can determine the subjective level of 
perceived control (Skinner, 1996). 
Past research has shown that an individual's perceived control is 
associated with both mental and physical well-being (Bandura, 1989; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Lefcourt, 1981; Seligman, 1975; Strickland, 
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1989). Researchers have argued that people are motivated to seek and achieve 
control (in the form of power, achievement, and self-efficacy) (Baumeister, 1998). 
In the event that an individual feels threatened by a loss of control, he or she may 
react in several ways including attempting to regain control or relinquishing 
control (Skinner, 1996). Researchers have shown that whether or not individuals 
will engage in efforts to regain control (i.e. cope with the situation) depends upon 
the attribution or appraisal of the situation (Skinner, 1996). For example, an 
individual who makes an initial appraisal of high control when threatened with a 
loss of control may engage in activities such as information seeking to gain a 
schematic understanding for an event (Fiske & Taylor, 2008) or the individual 
may exert direct behavioral action to regain control (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; 
Skinner, 1996). On the other hand, an individual who makes an appraisal of low 
control will be more likely to experience feelings of helplessness and passivity 
(Skinner, 1996). 
Deprivation of control in an environment that is actually uncontrollable can 
lead to an illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The illusion of control refers to an 
individual's expectancy of success even when the probability of success is low 
(Langer, 1975). Langer (1975) proposed a definition of the illusion of control as, 
"an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the 
objective probability would warrant" (p. 313). 
Researchers have hypothesized that perceptions of control may be 
threatened by stress and uncertainty. In an attempt to regain control, people may 
resort to using magical thinking or superstitious strategies (Jahoda, 1970; 
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Keinan, 1994; Keinan 2002; Singer & Benassi, 1981). This perceived control 
could be labeled illusory control (Langer, 1975); actual control cannot be gained 
using paranormal abilities if these abilities are not based in scientific reality 
(Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). For example, Case, Fitness, Cairns, and Stevenson 
(2004) varied the subjective probabilities of successfully choosing a correct target 
card. When the probability of success was high, participants chose their own 
card, which makes sense given their 88% probability of success. When the 
probability of success was lower (1 out of 8), however, participants chose the 
card selections of a psychic. The researchers claimed that this decision 
represented illusory control1 because participants were trying to reclaim control 
by relying on a strategy that was perceived as having higher levels of success 
when their own probability of success was low (Case et al., 2004). Individuals 
participating in games of chance in past research have exhibited greater levels of 
paranormal beliefs if they demonstrated an illusion of control (Brugger, et al., 
1990; Rudski, 2004). 
One way of studying perceived control is by examining participants' locus 
of control differences. Briefly speaking, locus of control refers to an individual's 
perception about the underlying causes of events in his or her life. A person with 
an internal locus of control generally believes that his or her internal 
characteristics (e.g., one's own effort, ability, or behavior) are responsible for 
outcomes (Rotter, 1966). At the other end of the continuum, a person with an 
external locus of control believes that external forces determine outcomes 
1
 Case and colleagues (2004) actually believed that their findings were related to participants' illusions of 
secondary control. 
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(Rotter, 1966). An individual's placement along the continuum is especially 
important in terms of health, self-efficacy, and well-being. An external locus of 
control is generally associated with negative coping skills such as attributing 
outcomes to fate and negatively affecting well-being (Arraras, Wright, Jusue, 
Tejedor, & Calvo, 2002; Lefcourt, 1982; Pearlin, 1999), whereas an internal locus 
of control is associated with positive, more effective coping skills such as 
information seeking and autonomous decision-making (Arraras, et al., 2002; 
Crisson & Keefe, 1988; Lefcourt, 1991). An internal locus of control is also 
generally associated with greater health and healthier behavior (Ai et al, 2005; AN 
& Lindstrom, 2006; Ecklund & Backstrom, 2006; Langer, 1983; Rodin & Langer, 
1977; Schulz, Thompkins, Wood, & Decker, 1987). 
Contrary to the findings supporting the relation of illusion of control to 
paranormal beliefs, an extensive amount of research has found that an external 
locus of control is associated with greater paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester, 
1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde, 
1997; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988). Some 
researchers, however, have found no relation between an external locus of 
control and paranormal beliefs (Haraldsson, 1981) or they have found that the 
relation is dependent upon whether researchers are examining traditional 
religious beliefs (Dag, 1999) or precognition and psi (Peltzer, 2002). One study 
conducted with an older age group of participants (55-73) indicated no positive 
correlation between paranormal beliefs and external control (Banziger, 1983). 
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Conflicting findings in the literature regarding perceived control (including 
locus of control) and paranormal beliefs may be explained when one examines 
the experimental paradigms used to study control. In their meta-analytic review, 
Presson and Benassi (1996) argued that many researchers who have discussed 
their studies in terms of control measurement are sometimes actually measuring 
other types of illusory judgments such as illusion of prediction. The researchers 
argued that [.anger's (1975) classic study in which participants were given the 
choice of keeping a lottery ticket or exchanging it for another was actually not a 
direct study of control, but rather "she inferred personal control perceptions on 
the part of her research participants" (Presson & Benassi, 1996, p. 497). 
Using Presson and Benassi's (1996) argument, one might conclude that 
Case and his colleagues (2004) were actually studying participants' illusory 
predictions, their perceived ability to predict target cards or their belief that 
another individual (the psychic) was able to predict target card choices. In fact, 
the task they used is really a measure of belief in clairvoyance - an ability to gain 
information through psychic means. In other words, clairvoyance is the ability to 
see or predict current events, such as cards in a guessing task. Additionally, in 
the study conducted by Brugger and colleagues (1990) participants did not 
actually have control in the study. Instead, they were asked to predict the 
probability of hypothetical dice rolls. The focus of this research, therefore, is on 
illusory judgments under the framework of illusion of prediction. Paranormal 
beliefs might arise from errors in human judgment (Singer & Benassi, 1981) and 
the illusion of prediction may be one of these errors in judgment. 
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Some researchers have argued that errors in human judgment related to 
paranormal beliefs result from deficiencies in cognitive processes or skills (Irwin, 
1993). The cognitive deficit hypothesis refers to the premise that cognitive 
deficiencies are positively associated with paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993). Below, 
I will review the research conducted in the area of cognitive deficiencies including 
errors in prediction and errors in reasoning. 
Illusory Judgments: Prediction and Reasoning Errors 
High believers in the paranormal tend to make more reasoning errors than 
nonbelievers (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et 
al., 1990; Dagnall et al., 2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985) and 
are less able to think critically (Gray & Mill, 1990). According to the probability 
misjudgment theory, paranormal beliefs may actually make participants more 
likely to misjudge probabilities, which may lead believers to illusory predictions -
believing they can predict random events (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; 
Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992). In 
another experiment, high believers in the paranormal were also more likely to 
rate the probability of throwing one die 10 times and rolling all sixes as more 
probable that throwing 10 dice one time and rolling all sixes (Brugger et al., 
1990). The results suggest that believers are less likely than nonbelievers to 
either incorrectly judge probability rates or to accept that repetitive events 
happen by chance (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). This latter 
suggestion is supported by research findings that participants who give self-
reports of belief in ESP are more likely to underestimate chance baseline than 
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are nonbelievers in a random game of chance (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985). 
Additionally, high believers were more likely to judge they were exerting control in 
a psychokinesis experiment based upon chance scoring than did nonbelievers 
(Benassi, Sweeney, & Drevno, 1979). 
The probability misjudgment theory has been contested. When cognitive 
abilities are controlled for in games of chance, often the relation between 
paranormal beliefs and errors in probabilistic judgments disappears. These 
results suggest that differences in cognitive ability can account for paranormal 
beliefs (Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). On the basis of their findings, Musch and 
Ehrenberg (2002) concluded that errors in probability judgments were not 
associated with paranormal beliefs. In a newspaper survey assessing 
participants' judgments of probability, Blackmore (1997) found that probability 
misjudgments were not predictive of paranormal beliefs. Other research has 
supported the finding that probability misjudgments are negated once education 
and cognitive ability have been controlled (Bressan, 2002). Similarly, other 
research has supported the finding that probability misjudgments are not 
significant predictors of paranormal beliefs (Roberts & Seager, 1999). However, 
this research did support the theory that paranormal believers are more likely to 
show reasoning errors such as lessened ability for conditional reasoning 
(Roberts & Seager, 1999). 
Dagnall and colleagues (2007) argued that the probability misjudgment 
hypothesis has only been studied in a partial way given the type of problems 
used to assess such misjudgments. In their research, they used a variety of 
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probabilistic reasoning tasks including the conjunction fallacy, perception of 
randomness, derivation of expected values, and use of base rate information 
(Dagnall et al., 2007). Based upon their results, they concluded that errors in 
probabilistic reasoning are conducive to paranormal beliefs, but only those errors 
related to misperception of randomness. Their results support the theory that 
high paranormal believers are more likely to discount the role of chance than 
nonbelievers (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). High paranormal 
believers, therefore, are more likely to believe that they can predict chance 
outcomes. In sum, research suggests that paranormal believers have faulty 
cognitions, which include illusory judgments (i.e., underestimating chance 
coincidences resulting in illusions of prediction). 
Another theory in the parapsychological research is that cultural influences 
may cause the endorsement of paranormal beliefs. Religion is one such powerful 
cultural influence, which may be related to belief in the paranormal. In fact, it is 
not uncommon for religions, such as Buddhism, to celebrate psi abilities such as 
clairvoyance. The rest of this review will discuss the role of religion in the 
endorsement of paranormal beliefs. 
Religion's Relation to Paranormal Beliefs 
Religion is a powerful predictor of a wide range of behavior and social 
attitudes (Dillon, 2003). National surveys document that the majority of 
Americans have a religious affiliation and believe in God (Newport, 2007). 
Furthermore, spirituality is growing and is less constrained by traditional religion 
than in the past (Roof, 2003). Religion refers to scriptures, social institutions, 
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rituals, beliefs, practices, and so on, whereas spirituality refers more to an inner 
sense of transcendence and self-transformation (Roof, 2003). Researchers must 
consider spiritualism when studying aspects of religiosity. 
There are similar parallels between religion and paranormalism including, 
first, an emphasis on rejection of the material and acceptance of the spiritual and, 
second, a belief in non-hypothetical truths (Goode, 2000). Certain characteristics 
of Eastern religions are, in themselves, paranormal including faith-healing, 
miracles, reincarnation, and visions (Goode, 2000). In fact, individuals who 
believe in paranormal phenomena are also more likely to accept a spiritual 
orientation to life (Goode, 2000). Findings from the Southern Focus Poll 
conducted by the University of North Carolina (as reported by Rice, 2003) 
indicated that 58.6% of respondents believed in psychic or spiritual healing, and 
27.1% believed that they could use their own minds to heal their bodies. These 
findings obviously contradict the popular belief that Christians will not hold classic 
paranormal beliefs because church dogmas do not support such beliefs (Sparks, 
2001). 
Religious individuals and believers in the paranormal must believe in that 
which cannot be scientifically proven and must rely on faith in certain beliefs. 
Even in the face of irrefutable evidence, there is often a strong tendency to 
believe. For example, Singer and Benassi (1986) found that, even after informing 
participants that the "magic" they had witnessed was replicable and pretend, 
participants still strongly maintained their beliefs that an actor's performance was 
indicative of his psychic abilities. Interestingly, many students pointed to their 
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religious beliefs as the explanation for their acceptance of the actor's psychic 
ability (e.g., "...I am a Christian and I feel strongly that ESP or anything dealing 
with that is of Satan") (Singer & Benassi, 1986, p. 62). 
The results of research that has examined the association between 
religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs has been mixed. Some researchers have 
found that religious people more strongly endorse paranormal beliefs (Goode, 
2000; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2005; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Deiin, 1995; 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), whereas some researchers have found that "non-
religious" people tend to endorse paranormal phenomena more strongly than 
religious people (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Bainbridge & Stark, 1980; Beck & 
Miller, 2001). Other researchers have claimed that paranormal beliefs are a 
substitute for traditional religious beliefs (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; Harrold & Eve, 
1986; Wuthnow, 1978). Results obtained by Hergovich et a i , (2005) partially 
support the substitution hypothesis; however, they claim that paranormal belief 
can be, but is not necessarily, a substitute for traditional religion. The researchers 
found that the relation between belief in the paranormal and religiosity was 
significantly higher for participants without religious affiliation (although this does 
not mean they were not spiritually inclined) than for Catholics and Protestants 
(Hergovich et al., 2005). 
Researchers have often associated New Age beliefs and belief in 
witchcraft as "non-religious'' beliefs (Bainbridge & Stark, 1980; Goode, 2000). A 
subscale of Tobycyk's (1988) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale is that of 
witchcraft (i.e., "witches do exist"), which is a separate subscale from traditional 
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religious beliefs (i.e., "there is a heaven and a hell"). This separation of religious 
beliefs from witchcraft beliefs could be an unfortunate error on the part of 
researchers studying religion's role in paranormal belief development. Wicca, a 
Neo-Pagan religion, has an estimated two million followers (Taniquetil & 
Arghuicha, 1999-2001). It is inaccurate for researchers to claim that witchcraft is 
a separate belief system from religious beliefs; it depends on whether witchcraft 
constitutes a religious worldview for the participant. An individual's endorsement 
of phenomena that are typically considered paranormal (i.e., precognition, 
telekinesis, clairvoyance) might predispose that individual toward choosing a 
religion that is formatted with an emphasis on such paranormal abilities (or visa 
versa and religion contributes to greater paranormal beliefs) (Willin, 2007). 
Religion is a relevant variable in the examination of paranormal beliefs. 
Religiosity has also been related to illusory judgments, in particular to 
illusion of control. In a crisis, individuals may feel threatened by a loss of control. 
Faith is one way of coping with this toss (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 
1996). Pargament and colleagues (1988) developed a theory of religious coping 
and problem-solving. In their theory, they distinguished between three types of 
religious problem-solving/coping: 1) the collaborative style in which the individual 
ami God are m active partnership; 2) the self-directive style in which reliance is 
on the self rather than on God in dealing with problems; and 3) the deferring style 
in which the individual relinquishes all problems for God to resolve. These styles 
of problem solving have been related to locus of control. The deferring style of 
religious belief is associated with external control, whereas the collaborative style 
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and self-directed style of religious belief are more associated with internal control 
(Pargament et al., 1988). Some research, however, has contradicted the finding 
that religiosity is related to personal perceived control; an inverse relation 
between religiosity and perceived control was found in a sample of older 
Americans (Shaw & Krause, 2001). 
An explanation for the contradictory results between religiosity and 
perceived control can be attributed to the complex nature between faith and 
control. There are multiple pathways by which faith may be related to perceived 
control (Ai et a l , 2005). First, religiosity may contribute to perceived control in 
uncontrollable situations (Ai et al., 2005). Second, some individuals may 
surrender to God, a religious worldview that discourages personal control (Ai et 
al., 2005). 
Understanding religion's role in the formation of beliefs about perceived 
control is important from a health perspective. Marx referred to religion as "the 
opiate of the masses" ([1852] 1983); however, religion can actually contribute to 
a sense of personal efficacy and control over life outcomes. The passive 
deferring style of belief has been associated with depression and anxiety (Exline, 
Yali, & Lobel, 1999), whereas the collaborative and self-directive styles of belief 
have been associated with better well-being, health, and increased self-worth 
(Ellison, 1993; Krause, 1995). Religious attendance also fosters mental health by 
enhancing self-esteem and personal efficacy (Ellison, 1993; Krause, 1995). 
Through self-directed and collaborative styles of belief, individuals increase their 
control and their mental health (Pargament et al., 1988). In a meta-analytic 
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review, McCullough and Smith (2003) reported that individuals with high levels of 
religiousness reported lower levels of depression. Religious attendance has also 
been associated with lower "hazard of death" (McCullough & Smith, 2003, p. 
194) from various causes including suicide (Hummer, Rogers, Nam, & Ellison, 
1999; Martin, 1984; Strawbridge, Cohen, Shema, & Kaplan, 1997). These results 
can also be partially attributed to the integrative capacities of religion in providing 
individuals with social networks that give a sense of belonging to and satisfaction 
with the community (Martinson, Wilkening, & Buttel, 1982). 
Religious affiliation and religiosity have not been studied in terms of 
illusory judgments other than control. This gap in the literature leads to questions 
about religiosity's relation to illusory prediction. If religiosity is related to belief in 
the paranormal, will high believers exhibit similar illusions in judgments? Further, 
if religiously inclined individuals are more likely to more strongly endorse 
paranormal beliefs, will they (in relation to paranormal believers) also be more 
likely to rely on a paranormal strategy in a card-guessing task? 
Proposed Integration and Rationale for Experiment 
The evidence available from previous research supports the idea that high 
believers in the paranormal exhibit more illusory judgments than skeptics. These 
reasoning errors such as misperception of randomness (Dagnall et al., 2007) 
lead high paranormal believers to discount the role of chance more than 
nonbelievers (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). In other words, 
believers in the paranormal are more likely than skeptics to find meaning in 
coincidences (Zusne & Jones, 1982). Possible life events (e.g., using a psychic 
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in the past) might lead high believers to faulty cognitions such that they believe 
the psychic is able to predict future events due to psi abilities. The current 
research will examine errors in reasoning, in particular illusory judgments of 
prediction, in a card-guessing task. 
Religion has been studied in relation to paranormal beliefs (Haraldsson, 
1981; MacDonald, 1995; Thalbourne & Houtkooper, 2002; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 
1992) and many researchers have linked religious beliefs to beliefs in the 
paranormal (Goode, 2000; Hergovich et al., 2005; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin, 
1995; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Aarnio and Lindeman (2007) found that religious 
believers were more likely than skeptics to rely on error prone intuitive thinking; 
however, cognitive reasoning in the form of illusory prediction has not been 
studied in relation to religious beliefs. The current research will examine the role 
of religious beliefs in illusory judgments of prediction and also determine if 
religiosity is associated with external control. 
The majority of researchers who have examined paranormal beliefs have 
tended to rely upon data from undergraduate college samples. A potential 
problem with using undergraduate students as the primary participants in these 
past studies is that the involvement of the students may be lower than a sample 
of adults who may be more actively involved in paranormal activities (McGarry & 
Newberry, 1981). Messer and Griggs (1989) conducted a study in which they 
asked students in an introductory psychology class about their belief in 
paranormal phenomena and their actual personal involvement. In partial support 
of the view that students are less involved, but have high paranormal beliefs, 
they found that, although 56.8% of students stated some to strong belief in 
ESP/psychokinesis, only 18.3% were personally involved in paranormal 
activities. 
McGarry and Newberry (1981) examined involvement in paranormal 
beliefs in a sample consisting of psychic readers (the most involved), ESP 
newsletter subscribers, psychic fair attendees, and students (least involved). The 
researchers found that belief in paranormal phenomena was associated with 
locus of control, but whether control was external or internal was mediated2 in 
part by involvement in paranormal beliefs. A psychic reader, therefore, would 
have a more internal locus of control than a college student, for example, who 
may hold paranormal beliefs, but who has no involvement in such beliefs. 
"Paranormal beliefs are associated with internality under conditions of behavioral 
involvement, but externality when such involvement is lacking" (McGarry & 
Newberry, 1981,p.734). 
The conclusion that paranormal involvement plays an important role in 
perceived control is supported by the research of Benassi and colleagues (1979). 
They found that active/internal participants were more confident in their level of 
control on more psychokinesis experimental trials than were active/external, 
passive/internal, or passive/external participants. The conclusion from their 
research is that active involvement in a task leads to higher levels of perceived 
control if a person has an internal locus of control (Benassi et al., 1979). 
2
 McGarry and Newberry refer to paranormal beliefs as being mediated by involvement In accordance 
with Baron and Kenny's (1986) distinctions between mediating and moderating variables, the term 
moderating is probably more appropriate. 
Paranormal beliefs may encourage involvement and involvement may reinforce 
beliefs (Irwin, 1993). 
Involvement in religion may also be an important variable. Frequency of 
church attendance in the United States is a contested issue. General Social 
Survey (2004) data indicate that approximately 28.3% of Americans attend 
church weekly or more often and 21.9% attend church at least monthly. 
However, some researchers have claimed that, when one actually takes into 
account church attendance records, self-reported attendance rates inflate actual 
attendance by approximately 50% (Chaves & Stephens, 2003). Keeping this in 
mind, it does appear that frequency of church attendance and involvement in 
religious activities is related to illusory control (Shrauger & Silverman, 1971). 
Research conducted by Shrauger and Silverman (1971) indicated that 
Protestants had a significantly more internal locus of control than Jewish 
participants, whereas Catholics did not differ significantly from either group. The 
Protestant participants reported greater religious participation and church 
attendance than the Jewish participants. However, the Jewish and Protestant 
participants did not differ significantly when only frequent attendees were 
analyzed. Shrauger and Silverman (1971) theorized that involvement in religious 
activities allowed participants to perceive that they controlled what happened to 
them in their lives. 
In terms of religious involvement with paranormal beliefs, Yamane and 
Polzer (1994) found that participants who were religiously involved (i.e., church 
attendance and prayer) were more likely to report paranormal experiences 
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related to religion (such as ecstatic experiences). The researchers argued that 
religiously involved (or absorbed) individuals would be more likely to report 
ecstatic experiences. Additionally, religiously involved participants have been 
found to be more likely to endorse paranormal beliefs related to telepathy 
(MacDonald, 1995). 
These research findings raise the concern that involvement needs to be 
considered when researching religious and paranormal beliefs in relation to 
illusory judgments. Participants in the current research will be asked to indicate 
their involvement in both religion and the paranormal. For example, participants 
will be given a checklist of psychic services and asked if they have used or 
performed these services. Further, participants will be asked about their level of 
involvement in their religion (e.g., church attendance). To expand upon past 
research, involvement will be used as a predictor of strategy choice in a card-
guessing task. This will be the only research, to date, to examine involvement 
(both religious and paranormal) using an illusion of prediction framework. 
One might question why it is important to study paranormal or religious 
beliefs. Putting aside the pervasiveness of these beliefs, one might consider the 
psychological advantages and disadvantages of endorsing non-scientific beliefs. 
Many studies have found that beliefs in the paranormal are associated with poor 
psychological adjustment, including irrational beliefs (Roig, Bridges, Renner, & 
Jackson, 1998), high trait anxiety (Wolfradt, 1997), psychopathology and 
dissociation (Dag, 1999; Gow, Lang & Chant, 2004), and low self-efficacy 
(Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991). On the other hand, researchers in the field of 
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religious beliefs have found that higher levels of religiosity are positively 
associated with greater levels of happiness (Abdel-Khalek, 2006), self-esteem 
(Keyes & Reitzes, 2007), optimism (Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007), physical 
health and mental health (Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007). Religiosity has been 
found to be negatively associated with alcohol use (Rostosky, Danner, & Riggle, 
2007), depression (Keyes & Reitzes, 2007), pessimism and suicidal ideation 
(Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007). 
There are many questions that remain unanswered or require further 
study in the paranormal and religious literature. First, are religiosity and belief in 
the paranormal related, and if so, will believers in the paranormal differ from 
believers in religion in a card-guessing task? Second, will religious and/or 
paranormal involvement differentiate participants who choose a psychic strategy 
from those who choose their own target selection? Will these results be related to 
an illusion of prediction and will they support the theories that paranormal beliefs 
are related to errors in reasoning such as mtsperception of randomness or 
probability? Finally, will paranormal and religious beliefs be associated with 
external control and can participants be differentiated based upon their level of 
religious/paranormal involvement? 
In Study 1, the experimental paradigm was assessed for believability and 
validity. Participants were asked to choose a card themselves or rely on the 
preexisting selections of a psychic. In Study 2, the addition of a third choice was 
assessed. Would participants still use the psychic's selections if another choice 
were available to them? Study 3 expanded on the findings of past research by 
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integrating religious and paranormal beliefs into an examination of illusory 
judgments under conditions of uncertainty. The goals of Study 3 included 
examining the individual differences that affected strategy selection as well 
replicating the findings from the first two studies. 
CHAPTER I 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 was conducted to test the believability of the experimental 
paradigm. It was hypothesized that when the subjective probability of success in 
a card-guessing task was low, participants would rely on the selections of 
another person. By relying on the prediction abilities of an outsider (e.g., a 
psychic), the participant would be making an illusory judgment that another 
individual was better able to predict chance events. 
Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 169 participants (61% female). Of these 
participants, 49.5% were aged 18-24, 36.9% were aged 25-39, and 13.6% were 
older than 40. Further, 77.7% were Caucasian and 63% had completed at least 
some college work (only 15.5% had stopped their education after high school). 
Materials 
Participants completed an online experiment on the SurveyMonkey site. 
Study 1 was conducted using a within subjects method. Participants were given 
10 trials (5 high probability and 5 low probability) and were asked to pick the 
correct card(s) out of 8 cards. They were informed that the probability of success 
was either 7:8 (high probability) or 1:8 (low probability). Participants completed 
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one of two ordered conditions. Condition 1 was ordered so that a high probability 
trial came first; condition 2 was ordered so that a low probability trial came first. 
The participants were told they could either pick a card themselves or have 
somebody else choose a card for them. The "somebody else" was described as 
individual who reported having psychic abilities such as ESP and precognition. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited using several different methods. First, every 
fifth group listed in each category of Yahoo Groups was selected, although 
selection was also dependent upon group rules (no spam postings) and the 
function of the group (only very specific topics allowed as postings). The 
moderators of these groups were emailed and asked if they could forward the 
link of the survey to their listserv. Second, the link was posted on the websites 
socialpsychofogy.org and psych.hanover.edu. Each participant was given a 
unique ID, which was not linked to any personal information, ensuring complete 
anonymity of participants. Furthermore, the researcher opted not to collect IP 
addresses, which could be used to track participants. 
Participants were told they were participating in an experiment 
researching the cognitive processes involved in online gambling. All participants 
were told they would be entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate. 
After completing the experiment, when participants hit the "done" button, they 
were brought to a page that was separate from the experimental survey. This 
page included the debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who 
wanted to enter the drawing were asked to fill in their personal information 
including name and email address. Again, data and personal information 
remained entirely separate. 
Results 
First, to determine whether there were order effects of high versus low 
probability as the first card selection, a MANOVA was conducted with the total 
psychic selection on the high probability and the low probability trials as the 
dependent variables and order as the independent variable. Order did not effect 
total psychic selection on the low probability trials (F (1,153) = 1.11, p = .30) or 
on the high probability trials (F (1,153) = .000, p = .990). 
To evaluate whether the probability of successfully choosing the correct 
card influenced the choice to self-select a card or to rely on the preexisting 
selections of the psychic, a paired-samples f-test was conducted. Participants 
were tested under two conditions (five trials each): (1) high probability of success 
and (2) low probability of success. The low probability trials and the high 
probability trials were coded so that 1 - choosing the psychic and 0 = making 
one's own choice. The mean for the low probability of success trials (M = 1.99, 
psychic chosen on 39.58% of trials) was significantly different from the mean for 
the high probability of success trials (M= .34, psychic chosen on 6.72% of trials): 
t (154) - 9.53, p < .001. When the probability of success was low, participants 
relied more on the preexisting selections of the psychic compared to when the 
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Figure 1: Strategy selection by subjective probability 
To determine whether any of the demographic variables (age, gender, 
education) as well as having used psychic services in the past predicted choice 
of psychic or self, standard multiple regressions were conducted using the total 
psychic selection for the high probability trials and the total psychic selection for 
the low probability trials as dependent variables. The regression models did not 
have significance, indicating that the only variable associated with strategy 
choice was probability of success. 
Discussion 
These results supported previous research (see Case et al., 2004) that 
participants will rely significantly more on the preexisting selections of the psychic 
when their subjective probability of success was low. Under conditions of 
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uncertainty, participants believed that the psychic was better able to predict 
target card choices. However, these results do not indicate an illusion of control 
(Case et al., 2004), but rather they indicate that participants believed that the 
psychic was better able to predict hidden card choices when the probability of 
success was low. These results are more aptly discussed using an illusion of 
prediction framework (Presson & Benassi, 1996). 
The results from this study support past research that participants who 
endorse paranormal beliefs make more reasoning errors than nonbelievers 
(Blackmore & Troscianki, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et al., 1990; 
Dagnall et al., 2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985). The results 
were not related to any demographic variables such as age, education, gender, 
or whether the participants had used a psychic before. The only variable that 
predicted reliance on the psychic was the probability of successfully choosing the 
target card. 
Further exploration of the relation between subjective probabilities and the 
illusion of prediction could be made by studying whether participants would rely 
on a more rational choice rather than on the psychic when such an option is 
made available. If, even given a third strategy choice, participants still rely on the 
psychic more substance can be given to the illusion of prediction results of this 
study. For this reason, Study 2 explores the choices made by participants in a 
card-guessing task when they can choose the choices of a psychic or have the 




Study 2 was conducted to evaluate if the availability of a third choice (e.g., 
a computer's selection) would be used by participants rather than relying on the 
psychic under conditions of uncertainty. In this study, participants were given the 
choice of having the psychic choose a card for them or allowing the computer to 
make a random selection. If belief in the paranormal was not related to strategy 




The sample consisted of 71 participants (62% female). Of the participants, 
39.4% were aged 18-24, 39.4% were aged 25-39, and 21.2% were older than 40. 
Further, 78.9% were Caucasian and 77.5% had completed college. 
Materials 
As in Study 1, Study 2 used a within subjects design. Participants were 
given 10 trials (5 high probability trials and 5 low probability trials) asking them to 
pick the correct card(s) out of 8 cards. The probability of success was either 7:8 
(high) or 1:8 (low). As in the first study, on each trial the participants were told 
they could either pick a card themselves or have somebody else choose a card 
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for them. The "somebody else" was an individual reported as having psychic 
abilities. Study 2 differed from Study 1, however, in that participants were also 
given a third choice (having the computer make a random card selection for 
them). 
Procedure 
The procedure used in Study 1 was also used in Study 2. Participants 
were told they were participating in an experiment researching the cognitive 
processes involved in online gambling. All participants were told they would be 
entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate. After completing the 
experiment, when participants hit the "done" button, they were brought to a page 
that was separate from the experimental survey. This page included the 
debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who wanted to enter the 
drawing were asked to fill in their personal information including name and email 
address. Again, data and personal information remained entirely separate. 
Results 
To determine whether the probability of successfully choosing the correct 
card influenced the choice to self-select a card, to rely on the preexisting 
selections of the psychic, or to allow the computer to make a random selection, 
several paired-samples f-tests were conducted. Participants were tested under 
two conditions (five trials each): (1) high probability of success and (2) low 
probability of success. The low probability trials and the high probability trials 
were coded to determine whether the mean number of times the participants 
chose the psychic was significantly different from the mean number of times the 
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participant chose the computer or the mean for self-selection based upon 
subjective probability levels. 
For the first planned contrast, the psychic was coded as 1 and the choices 
of computer and self were coded as 0. When the subjective probability was high, 
93% of participants always chose their own card; however, when the probability 
of success was low, only 52.1% always chose their own card. The mean for the 
low probability of success trials (M = 1.07, psychic chosen on 21.62% of trials) 
was significantly different from the mean for the high probability of success trials 
(M = .08, psychic chosen on 1.62% of trials): f (70) = -5.44, p < .001. Thus when 
the probability of success was low, participants relied more on the preexisting 




Figure 2: Strategy selection by subjective probability 
The second planned contrast was conducted to assess if the mean 
number of times the participant chose the psychic differed significantly from the 
mean number of times the participants chose his or her own card. Psychic was 
coded as 1, self was coded as - 1 , and the computer was coded as 0. When the 
probability of success was high, 83.1% of participants always chose their own 
card; however, when the probability of success was low, only 48% of participants 
always chose their own card. The mean for the low probability of success trials 
(M = -2.51 )3 was significantly different from the mean for the high probability of 
success trials (M= -4.55): f (70) = -5.78, p < .001. Although participants were 
more likely to choose their own card across the probabilities, they were more 
likely to rely on the psychic selections when the subjective probability of success 
was low compared to when it was high. 
The third planned contrast was conducted to assess if the choice of 
psychic differed significantly from the choice to allow the computer to make a 
random selection. Psychic was coded as 1, computer was coded as - 1 , and self 
was coded as 0. The mean for the low probability of success trials {M = .72) was 
significantly different from the mean for the high probability of success trials (M = 
-.20): t (70) = 3.66, p < .001. Participants were more likely to rely on the psychic 
selections than to allow the computer to make a random selection when the 
subjective probability of success was low compared to when it was high. 
To assess whether any of the demographic variables (age, gender, 
education) as well as having used psychic services in the past predicted choice 
3
 Note that means are negative because self was coded as - 1 . Negative numbers indicate that participants 
chose their own card to a greater extent than relying on the psychic's selections. 
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strategy, standard multiple regressions were conducted using the total psychic 
selection for the high probability trials and the total psychic selection for the low 
probability trials as dependent variables. The regression models did not have 
significance, although in the low probability condition, age uniquely predicted a 
significant proportion of variance in number of times the psychic was selected (p 
= .047) and in the high probability condition, gender uniquely predicted a 
significant proportion of variance in number of times the psychic was selected (p 
= .050). Younger participants and women chose the psychic more often than 
older participants and men. 
Discussion 
Even when given a third choice selection, participants were still inclined to 
rely on the prediction abilities of the psychic rather than allow the computer to 
make a random selection. Further, 71% of participants chose their own cards in 
the apparent belief that they were able to predict target cards. 
Why do some participants rely on the selections of the psychic (i.e., 
other's prediction ability) rather than choosing a card themselves (i.e., self 
prediction ability)? Do the paranormal beliefs of participants affect their strategy 
selection? If the belief in the paranormal is related to errors in reasoning, will high 
believers be more likely to misjudge probabilities or to misjudge randomness and 
believe they (or others) can predict random events (Blackmore & Troscianko, 
1985; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992)? Further, if paranormal 
beliefs are linked to religious beliefs (Goode, 2000; Hergovich et al., 2005; 
Thalbourne, Dunbar & Delin, 1995; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), will highly religious 
believers differ from participants with low levels of religiosity? Will religiosity be 
related to errors in reasoning such as the illusion of prediction? Additionally, will 
participants who are highly involved in their beliefs (i.e., believe they can predict 
chance events or perform paranormal services) affect their strategy? The 
purpose of Study 3 was to evaluate whether individual differences of participants 
(i.e., religiosity or paranormal beliefs) would predict strategy choice in a card-
guessing task. 
Unlike the first two studies, Study 3 was conducted using a between 
subjects design. In the first two studies, participants received five trials of each 
probability in which the high trial came first and the low trial came second or vice 
versa. This order enabled participants to compare probabilities from trial to trial 
and may have resulted in some participant suspicion about the purpose of the 
study. In Study 3, participants were not able to compare probabilities from trial to 
trial. This will provide a replication using a different design if participants still 




The basic purpose of Study 3 was to evaluate whether the results from the 
first two studies would replicate using a between-subjects design. The second 
purpose was to investigate how individual differences (such as paranormal and 
religious beliefs and involvement) as well as errors in reasoning predicted illusory 
judgments of prediction. It was hypothesized that high believers in the 
paranormal would rely on the psychic's selections to a greater degree under 
conditions of uncertainty (i.e., low subjective probability) and to a greater degree 
than low believers. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that individuals with 
high personal paranormal involvement (i.e., performance of psychic services as 
well as the belief in own psychic abilities) would choose the psychic less often 
than individuals with low personal involvement. Further, it was hypothesized that 
participants with only general paranormal involvement (i.e., having used a 
psychic in the past, but not being personally involved) would choose the psychic 
more often based upon past experience than participants with low general 
involvement. 
In terms of religious beliefs, it was hypothesized that religiosity would be 
positively related to belief in the paranormal (see MacDonald, 1995; Yamane & 
Polzer, 1994). Further, it was expected that participants who were higher in 
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religious involvement (e.g., church attendance and religiosity) would rely less on 
the selections of a psychic. 
It was expected that women would endorse paranormal (Vyse, 1997) and 
religious beliefs (Stark, 2002) to a greater extent than men. It was expected, that 
younger participants (college students) would choose the psychic selection more 
often than older participants based upon past research indicating that college 
students are less involved in their paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs when 
compared to an older sample (McGarry & Newberry, 1981). 
It was also hypothesized that the probability misjudgment hypothesis 
would not be related to paranormal beliefs (Blackmore, 1997; Bressan, 2002; 
Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Roberts & Seager, 1999); however, it was expected 
that overestimation of probability would be associated with choosing the psychic 
more often (i.e., an illusion of prediction). Finally, based upon past research, it 
was expected that participants with low paranormal or religious involvement 
would exhibit an external locus of control (see Allen & Lester, 1994; Groth-
Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde, 1997; 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988); however, participants 
high in paranormal or religious involvement were not expected to exhibit external 




The sample consisted of 248 participants (62% female). Of these 
participants, 64% were aged 18-24, 25% were aged 25-39, and 11% were older 
than 40. Further, 29% were Catholic, 29% were Protestant/Methodist/Baptist, 
and 32% had no religious affiliation or labeled themselves "spiritual". 
Geographically, 64% were from the northeastern part of the United States. In 
terms of education, 39.5% had completed college (only 7% had stopped their 
education after high school). When participants were asked to rate their own 
psychic abilities (from 1 = don't have any to 10 = excellent), only 51% said they 
didn't have psychic abilities and 12.5% rated their psychic abilities above a 5 (M 
= 2.29, SD = 1.85). Additionally, 55.3% of participants had used a psychic 
service at least once (M = 1.58, SD = 1.83) and 31.9% had performed at least 
one psychic service such as tarot card or palm reading (M = .65, SD = 1.26). 
Materials 
Study 3 used a between subjects design. Participants were given 10 trials 
and asked to select the target object(s) out of 8 objects such as playing cards, 
cases containing money, doors behind which were prizes and so on. The 
probability of success was either 1:8 (Condition 1 - Low Probability) or 7:8 
(Condition 2 -High Probability). On each trial, as in Study 1, the participants were 
told they could either pick a card themselves or have somebody else choose a 
card for them. The "somebody else" was an individual reported as having psychic 
abilities. 
41 
Participants were also asked to complete several questionnaires. The 20-
item Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977; modified by 
Presson & Benassi) was administered to assess paranormal beliefs. The scale 
includes 20 items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree. The range of possible scores is 20 -100. The scale taps 
participants' beliefs about psychic phenomena in general, ESP, telepathy, and 
precognition. Seven of the questions were designed to tap self-paranormal 
abilities. For example, "I believe that I can project my thoughts to another 
person." Reliability of the scale was high (a= .94). To assess paranormal 
involvement, the self-paranormal ability subscale was used. In addition, 
participants were asked if they had ever used psychic services as well as 
whether they had ever performed psychic services (such as palm reading or tarot 
reading). 
To assess participants' control orientation, they were also given the 
Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scale (Levenson, 1981). The scale 
comprises 24 items on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from -3 = strongly disagree 
to +3= strongly agree. The scale is divided into 3 subscales comprised of 8 items 
each (e.g., internality, powerful others, and chance). With the addition of a 
constant of 24 to each subscale to eliminate negative scores, the range of 
possible scores on each scale is 0 - 48. An example of an item from the 
internality subscale is, "I can pretty much determine what happens in my life"; 
from the powerful others scale, "I feel like what happens in my life is mostly 
determined by powerful people"; and from the chance scale, "To a great extent 
my life is controlled by accidental happenings." Reliability of the internality scale 
was low (a = .64). Reliabilities of the powerful others scale (a = .74) and chance 
scale (a = .72) were moderate. 
Religiosity was assessed using the 12-item Religiousness Scale 
(Strayhorn, Weidman, & Larson, 1990). Most of the items use a 5-point Likert 
scale, although some items use a 6-point scale with various selection choices 
depending in the question being asked. For example, the question, "How 
religious would you say you are?" is rated from 1 = Not all to 5 = Very much. The 
question, "On the average, how often have you attended religious worship 
services (i.e., Sunday morning, evening, and/or other days) during the last year?" 
was rated using the choices: Never, a few times a year, only on Holidays, once 
or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly, more than once a week. The scores 
could range from 12 - 61. The reliability of the scale was high (a = .93). Religious 
involvement was assessed using the worship attendance and the frequency of 
prayer questions. 
Additionally, to control for context effects, after completing the online 
experiment portion of this study, participants completed several distraction tasks 
including word jumbles and the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (Harding & 
Phillips, 1986). Participants were also asked demographic information including 
age, education, gender, psychic services used, psychic services performed, and 
their own perceived psychic ability. Finally, participants were also asked to 
indicate the actual probability that they would have been able to select the 
correct target object. 
43 
Procedure 
The procedure used in Study 3 replicated that of Study 1 and Study 2. In 
Study 3, however, students were also recruited from several psychology classes 
on campus and were given extra credit by their professors for their participation. 
Each participant was given a unique ID, which was not linked to any personal 
information, ensuring complete anonymity of participants. Furthermore, the 
researcher opted not to collect IP addresses, which could be used to track 
participants. Data and participants information for the prize drawing also 
remained separate. 
Participants were told they were participating in an experiment 
researching the cognitive processes involved in online gambling. All participants 
were told they would be entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate. 
After completing the experiment (approximately 10-15 minutes), participants 
indicated their judgment of the probability they could choose a target object 
successfully and then completed the Moral Behaviors Scale, several word 
jumbles, and the Belief in the Paranormal Scale, Internality, Powerful Others, and 
Chance scale, Religiousness Scale, and then answered several demographic 
questions. When participants hit the "done" button, they were brought to a page 
that was separate from the experimental survey. This page included the 
debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who wanted to enter the 
drawing were asked to fill in their personal information including name and email 
address. Again, data and personal information remained entirely separate. 
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Results 
To evaluate if participants varied in their selection of the psychic based 
upon probability using a between-subjects design, an ANOVA was conducted 
with condition as the independent variable and total number of psychic selections 
as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of condition (F (1,239) 
= 29.86, p < .001). Participants in the low subjective probability condition were 
more likely to choose the psychic (M = 3.07, SD = 3.43) than participants in the 









Figure 3: Strategy selection by subjective probability 
To evaluate whether participant demographics, the scales, and 
participants' judgments of probability (overestimation versus correct) were related 
in the overall sample, bivariate correlations were conducted (Table 1). The 
paranormal involvement items were broken down into two factor scores: the 7 
self-belief items from the paranormal beliefs scale and the 8 items indicating 
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performance of a psychic service were forced onto one factor score labeled 
personal involvement (a = .84) and the 8 items indicating general use of a 
psychic service in the past were forced onto one factor score labeled general 
involvement (a = .62). Religious involvement was assessed using the total score 
for frequency of worship attendance and frequency of prayer. 
There were no correlations between gender and any of the paranormal or 
religious variables. There was a negative correlation between age and religious 
affiliation as well as between age and religiosity. Younger participants were less 
likely than older participants to be religious. There was a positive correlation 
between age and general paranormal involvement. Older participants were more 
generally involved in their paranormal beliefs (i.e., having used a psychic). There 
was a negative correlation between education and paranormal beliefs as well as 
between education and personal paranormal involvement. Participants with less 
education were more likely to endorse paranormal beliefs and be personally 
involved in these beliefs (i.e., performing psychic services). Participants with less 
education were also more likely to believe in powerful others and to believe in 
chance. Not surprisingly, there was a negative correlation between education 
and probability assessment. Participants who had less education were more 
likely to overestimate the probability of choosing a target object successfully. 
There was a negative correlation between religious involvement and 
internality. Participants who were more religiously involved were less likely to 
exhibit internal control. There was also a positive correlation between paranormal 
beliefs and belief in chance as well as between personal involvement and belief 
in chance. Participants who endorsed paranormal beliefs and participants who 
were personally involved in those beliefs were more likely to believe in chance. 
Finally, there was a positive correlation between paranormal beliefs and 
probability judgment as well as between the paranormal involvement variables 
and probability judgment. Participants who endorsed paranormal beliefs as well 
as those who were personally or generally involved in their paranormal beliefs 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether 
paranormal beliefs and paranormal involvement would predict total psychic 
selection (See Table 2). The total number of times the psychic was selected on 
the ten trials was used as the predicted variable and the following variables were 
used as predictor variables: general paranormal beliefs (i.e., the total of the 
paranormal belief scale without the inclusion of the self-belief items was 
converted into a z-score), personal involvement (i.e., performing psychic services 
and belief in personal psychic ability), general involvement (i.e., using a psychic 
service in the past), as well as the interaction terms for paranormal beliefs by 
personal involvement, and paranormal beliefs by general involvement. The high 
probability condition lacked variability (the psychic was only chosen 10% of the 
trials); therefore, it was excluded from analyses. 
The overall regression for the low probability condition was statistically 
significant, R = .379, R2 = AAA, adjusted R2 = .105, F (5, 110) = 3.69, p = .004. 
To assess the statistical significance of the contributions of individual predictors, 
the f ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Three of the five 
predictors were significantly predictive of total psychic selection; these included 
paranormal beliefs, f(110) = 2.58, p = .011; personal involvement, f(110) = -2.22, 
p = .029; and general involvement, f(110) = 2.60, p = .011. The nature of the 
predictive relation of paranormal beliefs was as expected; the positive sign for 
the slope indicated that participants with higher scores on the paranormal belief 
scale chose the psychic more often than participants with lower scores. The 
49 
Table 2: Results of Standard Multiple Regression to Predict Total Psychic Selection 
From Paranormal Beliefs, Personal Involvement, and General Involvement. 
TPS GPB PI Gl b B sr2 unique 
GPB .178 2.98* .417 .05 
PI .055 .823 -1.35* -.382 .04 
Gl .271 .327 .335 .905* .248 .05 
Mean 3.26 -.180 -.112 .209 
SD 3.57 1.09 1.02 .980 
R2 = AAA 
^ , = .105 
R = .379 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, TPS = Total Psychic Selection, GPB = General Paranormal Beliefs, PI 
= Personal Involvement, and Gl = General Involvement. TPS based upon selection out of 10 
trials. GPB, PI, and Gl are standardized scores with mean of 0. 
predictive relation of personal involvement was also as expected; the negative 
sign for the slope indicated that participants who were more personally involved 
in their paranormal beliefs (i.e., believing they had their own psychic abilities as 
well as performing psychic services) relied on the psychic less often than 
participants with lower scores. Finally, the nature of the predictive relation of 
general paranormal involvement (i.e., using a psychic service in the past) was 
also as expected; the positive sign for the slope indicated that participants 
scoring higher on general involvement chose the psychic more often than 
participants scoring lower. There were no significant interactions between 
paranormal beliefs and paranormal involvement. 
A standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether religious 
beliefs and religious involvement would predict total psychic selection (See Table 
3). The total number of times the psychic was selected out of ten trials was used 
as the predicted variable and the following variables were used as predictor 
variables: religious beliefs (median split into high and low groups), religious 
involvement (i.e., frequency of worship attendance and frequency of prayer 
totaled and then median split into high and low), as well as the interaction term 
for religious beliefs by religious involvement. The high probability condition 
lacked variability (the psychic was only chosen 10% of the trials); therefore, it 
was excluded from analyses. 
The overall regression for the low probability condition was not statistically 
significant, R = .206, R2 = .042, adjusted R2 = .016, F (3, 107) = 1.58, p = .198. 
Religious involvement did, however, emerge as a significant predictor variable, 
f(107) = -2.07, p = .041. The predictive nature of religious involvement to total 
psychic selection was as expected; participants who were less religiously 
involved chose the psychic more often than participants who were more 
religiously involved. 
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Table 3: Results of Standard Multiple Regression to Predict Total Psychic Selection 
From Religious Beliefs and Religious Involvement. 
TPS RB Rl b p Sonique 
RB -.007 .789 .111 .01 
Rl -.183 .496 -1.68* -.237 .04 
Mean 3.31 1.51 1.50 
SD 3.55 .502 .502 
R2 =.042 
^ = • 0 1 6 
R = .206 
Note: *p< .05, **p < .01, TPS = Total Psychic Selection, RB = Religious Beliefs, Rl = Religious 
Involvement TPS based upon selection out of 10 trials, RB and Rl are standardized scores with a 
mean of 0. 
To assess whether participants' judgments of probability affected their 
choice to rely on the psychic, an ANOVA was conducted using total number of 
times the psychic was chosen as the independent variable and probability 
judgment (-1 = underestimation, 0 = correct, and 1 = overestimation) as the 
dependent variable. As predicted, there was a significant main effect for 
probability judgment: F, (2, 233) = 4.63, p = .011, T|P2 = .038. Tukey post hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants who overestimated the probability of 
guessing the target's location successfully (M - 3.17, SD - 3.36) chose the 
psychic significantly more often than participants who underestimated the 
probability of success (M = 1.37, SD = 2.08). To evaluate whether controlling for 
education would eliminate this effect, partial correlations between probability 
judgment, total psychic selection, and education were computed. Controlling for 
education did not eliminate the significant correlation between total psychic 
selection and probability judgment (r= .183, p = .007). 
Finally, a standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether 
participant demographics and the control subscales would predict total psychic 
selection. The total number of times the psychic was chosen over ten trials was 
used as the independent variables and the following variables were used as 
predictor variables: Gender (0 = female, 1 = male), Age (0 = older than 25,1 = 
18-24), Education (0 = high school, 1 = college or higher), Religious Affiliation (0 
= none/other, 1 = traditional religion), and the Internality, Powerful Others, and 
Chance subscales. The overall regression for the low probability condition was 
statistically significant, R = .354, R2 = .126, R2^ = .072, F (7,114) = 4.42, 
p <.001. To assess the contributions of individual predictors, the f ratios for the 
individual regression slopes were examined. Only one of the seven predictors 
significantly predicted of total psychic selection; this predictor was belief in 
chance, f(114) = 2.18, p = .031, b = .158, p = .248, sr^ nique = 04. The predictive 
relation of belief in chance to psychic selection was as expected; participants 
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who more strongly exhibited a belief in chance chose the psychic more often 
than participants who less strongly exhibited a belief in chance. 
Discussion 
The first hypothesis that the results from the first two studies would be 
replicated using a between-subject design in Study 3 was supported. Participants 
in the low probability of success condition (i.e., under conditions of uncertainty) 
were more likely to choose the psychic strategy than participants in the high 
probability of success condition. 
The hypothesis that participants with higher paranormal beliefs would 
choose the psychic more often than those with lower beliefs was supported. 
Further, the hypotheses related to paranormal involvement were both supported. 
Participants with more personal paranormal involvement chose the psychic less 
often than did participants with less involvement. These participants had 
performed a psychic service in the past and were also more likely to believe that 
they had their own psychic ability. It is not surprising that they would believe they 
could predict the hidden object's location. On the other hand, participants with 
more general paranormal involvement chose the psychic more often than those 
with less general involvement. These participants has used a psychic service in 
the past, so it is also not surprising that they would expect the psychic to be able 
to predict the object's location given their past experiences. 
The hypothesis that higher paranormal beliefs would be positively 
associated with higher religious beliefs was not supported; there was no 
association between any of the paranormal variables and any of the religious 
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variables. Although the overall regression to predict total psychic selection from 
the religious variables was not statistically significant, the hypothesis that higher 
religious involvement would be associated with choosing the psychic less often 
was supported. Participants who were less religiously involved chose the psychic 
less often than participants who were more involved. 
Contrary to past research and the study hypotheses, results from Study 3 
indicated that men and women did not differ in their endorsement of paranormal 
beliefs (Vyse, 1997) or religious beliefs (Stark, 2002). Women and men did not 
differ significantly in terms of paranormal beliefs, religious beliefs, involvement, or 
how often they chose the psychic strategy. 
In partial support of the hypothesis that age would be significantly 
associated with beliefs and involvement, younger participants were less likely to 
be religious; however, age was not associated with religious involvement. 
Younger participants were also more generally involved in their paranormal 
beliefs than older participants; this result was not expected, but may be due to 
the availability of psychic services at campus events and as campus 
entertainment. Age was not associated with personal paranormal involvement. 
These findings concerning age are important given that many past studies have 
been conducted using samples of college students. This research supports past 
research that younger individuals are less religious than older individuals; 
however, it also supports past research that age is not positive correlated with 
paranormal beliefs (G6ritz & Schumacher, 2000; Haraldsson, 1981). However, 
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age was negatively correlated with general paranormal involvement, but in the 
opposite direction of what was expected. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that religious involvement would be related to 
greater internal control, participants who were less religiously involved were more 
likely to exhibit internal control. This finding may be explained by the argument 
that religious involvement in the form of worship attendance and prayer are 
methods that some individuals use to defer to God. Deferment to God 
discourages personal control (Ai et al., 2005). 
There was, however, a significant positive relation between general 
paranormal beliefs and the belief in chance as well as personal paranormal 
involvement and the belief in chance. These findings can be discussed in one of 
two ways. First, this finding partially supports past research and the study 
hypothesis that an external locus of control would be associated with greater 
paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester, 1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 
1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde, 1997; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, 
Nagot, & Miller, 1988). However, this explanation runs counter to the hypothesis 
that individuals who are more personally involved in their paranormal beliefs and 
believe that they have their own psychic abilities would exhibit internal control. 
Another way to explain these findings requires taking a closer look at Levenson's 
(1981) chance subscale. One could argue that the chance subscale is actually a 
measurement of luck. 
Luck and chance are two distinct concepts (Friedland, 1998; Wagenaar & 
Keren, 1988). Chance can be thought of as a mechanism occurring in the 
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environment; therefore, chance is an external factor (Friedland, 1988) or random 
event (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). Luck, on the other hand, is seen as an internal 
factor, which can be manipulated (Friedland, 1998) and may lead to an illusion of 
control (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988). Luck-oriented persons see luck as a skill to 
be mastered (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). If one views Levenson's (1981) scale as a 
measure of luck than participants exhibit higher paranormal beliefs and personal 
involvement actually would have been more likely to believe that the card-
guessing task involved luck - an internal factor. 
Finally, the hypothesis that overestimating the probability of choosing a 
target's location successfully (i.e., an illusion of prediction) would be related 
positively to psychic selection as well as to religious and paranormal beliefs was 
supported. Participants who overestimated their probability of success chose the 
psychic significantly more often than participants who underestimated their 
probability of success. These results support the hypothesis that participants 
would choose the psychic more often based upon an illusion of prediction; the 
belief that the psychic was better able to predict target objects. Overestimation of 
probability was also positively related to paranormal beliefs and both paranormal 
involvement variables. Although participants with more education were less likely 
to endorse paranormal beliefs and to be personally involved as well as more 
likely to judge probability accurately, controlling for education did not eliminate 
the significant positive relation between psychic selection and probability 
judgments. These results are partially supportive of the probability misjudgment 
theory (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & 
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Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992) that paranormal beliefs cause individuals to 
misjudge probability; however, these results were not directly related to 
paranormal beliefs but rather to choosing a psychic strategy under conditions of 
uncertainty. Participants who misjudged probability were more likely to choose 
the psychic if they overestimated probability and less likely to choose the psychic 
if they underestimated probability. These results indicate that participants 




The present research aimed to expand the investigation of paranormal 
and religious beliefs in relation to illusory judgments by assessing the illusion of 
prediction in an experimental card-guessing task. Another purpose of this 
research was to determine whether religious and paranormal beliefs were related 
and to expand upon research by determining if religious beliefs could also be 
related to illusory judgments. Another purpose of this dissertation was to 
ascertain whether errors in reasoning such as probability over or underestimation 
as well as perceived control would predict participants' selection of the psychic 
strategy. 
Study 1 explored the experimental paradigm and found that participants 
were more likely to rely on a paranormal strategy under conditions of uncertainty. 
Study 2 expanded upon Study 1 by determining whether the addition of a third 
choice would eliminate paranormal strategy selection. Results indicated that 
participants still relied more on the paranormal strategy under conditions of 
uncertainty even when allowed a third choice strategy. The results of the first two 
studies indicated that the paranormal strategy selection was pervasive under 
conditions of uncertainty. Questions were raised about the individual differences 
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of participants who consistently selected the psychic strategy as opposed to 
choosing their own target object. 
Study 3 was conducted using a between-subjects design to evaluate 
whether the results from Study 1 and Study 2 (based upon within-subjects 
designs) would replicate. Further, Study 3 examined demographics as well as the 
ability to judge probability successfully and individual difference variables such as 
paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs. The results from Study 3 replicated 
those in Study 1 and Study 2. Participants were more likely to choose the 
psychic's selection under the condition of uncertainty. 
The finding that participants chose the psychic more often under 
conditions of uncertainty was linked to inaccurate probability judgments and was 
partially supportive of past research indicating that paranormal beliefs are 
associated with misjudgment of probability (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; 
Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992). In this 
research, however, it was not paranormal beliefs that were associated with 
probability misjudgment, but rather selection of a paranormal strategy. 
Participants who overestimated the probability of choosing the correct object 
location chose the psychic more often than those who underestimated 
probability. It all likelihood, it was not that probability misjudgments led to 
choosing the psychic, but rather that choosing the psychic led to probability 
misjudgments. Participants who chose the psychic numerous times 
overestimated the probability that they chose the option that would be successful 
(i.e., choosing the psychic). These findings were not eliminated after controlling 
for education as would be predicted from past research (Bressan, 2002; Musch & 
Ehrenberg, 2002), suggesting that participants exhibited an illusion of prediction; 
they believed that the psychic was better able to predict hidden objects in a 
condition with low probability of success. 
It might be argued that participants were simply deflecting responsibility to 
another individual (e.g., the psychic) when their probability of failure was high; 
however, Case and colleagues (2004) addressed this issue by including two 
other possible choices for selection strategy. In their study, participants were 
given the choice of a psychic's, academic's, or student's preexisting selections. 
Participants were still more likely to choose the psychic than the academic or 
student, indicating that participants were not simply responding based upon 
attributional biases (Case et al., 2004). 
The results of this dissertation further emphasize the need to consider 
paranormal involvement in studies of paranormal beliefs (Benassi et al., 1979; 
Irwin, 1993; McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer and Griggs, 1989). Participants 
with higher personal paranormal involvement and those with higher religious 
involvement chose the psychic less often than participants with less paranormal 
or religious involvement. General paranormal involvement, however, was 
associated with choosing the psychic more often. Participants with higher 
paranormal involvement were those who believed that they possessed psychic 
ability; as such it would not make sense for them to choose the psychic's 
selections. To some extent, it was surprising that personal paranormal 
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involvement was not related to internality; however, an alternative explanation 
regarding Levenson's (1981) chance subscale may account for this finding. 
As argued in the discussion for Study 3, Levenson's (1981) chance 
subscale may actually be a measurement of luck (for example, an item from this 
scale is, "When I get what I want, it's usually because I am lucky"). Researchers 
have found a significant positive association between belief in luck and belief in 
chance (Darke & Freedman, 1997). If the chance subscale is evaluated as 
actually representing chance, then this research supports past research that 
external control is associated with paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester, 1994; 
Groth-Marnat & Pedgen, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheldt, 1973; Tobacyk & Milford, 
1983; Tobacyk et al., 1988). However, if the chance subscale is evaluated as 
representing luck then paranormal beliefs and personal paranormal involvement 
are associated with an internal, controllable, skill factor (Friedland, 1998; 
Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). 
Another important implication of this research relates to the findings 
regarding age. Although age was not associated with paranormal beliefs, which 
supports past research (Goritz & Schumacher, 2000; Haraldsson, 1981), it was 
associated with religious beliefs and paranormal involvement. Younger 
participants were less religious and less likely to be personally involved in their 
paranormal beliefs; however, younger participants were more likely to be 
generally involved in their paranormal beliefs. As previously discussed, younger 
participants may have more opportunities to use psychic services on their college 
campuses. Campus activity boards often book psychic entertainment such as 
palm readers, fortunetellers, or mediums for small and large-scale events. The 
results regarding age are important given that much of the data related to 
paranormal beliefs has been drawn from undergraduate college samples. These 
results support past research that involvement is an important variable and that 
undergraduates differ from the general population in their levels of involvement 
(McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer & Griggs, 1989). 
This research is also theoretically important in its contribution to the 
religious research literature. Participants who were more religiously involved 
were actually less likely to exhibit internal control. This finding contrasts that of 
Shrauger and Silverman (1971) who found that religious involvement was 
associated with greater internal control; however, in their research, church 
attendance was the only variable related to involvement and the effect was only 
significant for women. Religious involvement in this study was measured using 
worship attendance as well as frequency of prayer. Further, given that there 
were no sex differences for the endorsement of paranormal beliefs or religious 
beliefs, a sex difference related to involvement and control would not be 
expected. 
This research also contributes to the literature regarding religion and 
illusory judgments. Participants who were more religiously involved were less 
likely to choose the psychic than those who were less religiously involved. These 
results indicate that religiously involved participants were less likely to make 
illusory judgments of prediction regarding the psychic's ability. 
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There were limitations related to the studies conducted in this dissertation. 
First, the experimental design might have lacked mundane realism and, 
therefore, might not generalize to situations outside of the experiment. 
Furthermore, participants might have been able to easily determine the purpose 
of the research (especially with the inclusion of a psychic as a strategy offered). 
Suspicion about the psychic could have lead participants to choose their own 
cards instead of relying on the psychic. Future research should include a control 
manipulation that measures participant suspicion. 
Additionally, this Internet research limited the available number of 
questions that could be asked in order to avoid participant dropout. It would have 
been useful to include two measures of control including Rotter's (1966) bi-
dimensional scale of internal and external control in addition to a second 
measure of paranormal beliefs such as the revised Paranormal Belief Scale 
(PBS-R; Tobacyk, 1988). The PBS-R taps psi phenomena in addition to beliefs 
about witchcraft and traditional religious beliefs. There are also sample issues 
that must be taken into account with online research such as repeat responders 
and non-serious responses. However, comparative analyses of traditional 
methods versus Internet methods indicate that non-serious and/or repeat 
responders do not affect data significantly (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 
2004). Gosling and colleagues (2004) argued that Internet findings are 
consistent with findings from traditional methods and pose no serious issues in 
validity or reliability beyond those found in traditional studies; however, Internet 
studies offer the additional advantage of a more diverse sample. 
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Another limitation involves the question about the psychic services used. 
The use of psychic services is not necessarily indicative of involvement in the 
paranormal. Many college campuses offer entertainment to students in the form 
of persons claiming to be psychics. It is not surprising that many participants had 
used at least one psychic service. It may have been more telling to ask 
participants how many services they had used in addition to how often they have 
used these services. Future research may also want to inquire as to how often 
participants watch television show related to the paranormal such as shows 
where David Blaine or Criss Angel purport to be able to do extraordinary feats. 
Future research should also examine paranormal strategy selection after 
positive affect mood inducements to determine if strategy and paranormal beliefs 
are related to the experiential system, especially given recent findings that 
paranormal believers are just as able as skeptics to regulate their emotional 
coping (Rogers, Qualter, Phelps, & Gardner, 2006). High paranormal believers 
may be individuals who have perceived paranormal phenomena and relied on 
the experiential/intuitive system to process these phenomena. This reliance on 
the experiential system may have caused them to label these events as valid 
(King et al., 2007); therefore, high believers might be even more likely to believe 
that the psychic is able to predict chance events. 
It might also be worthwhile to examine other experimental manipulations 
related to this dissertation's experimental paradigm. For example, participants 
might be asked to wager money on each trial. It would be interesting to examine 
whether participants' strategy selections change in relation to gambling 
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manipulations. This research could also be conducted using mood manipulations 
to determine if more positive affect would be related to greater reliance on the 
psychic strategy under conditions of uncertainty even when participants are 
asked to wager money on low probability trials. 
In conclusion, this research contributes a wider body of research related to 
religious and paranormal beliefs. The findings support past research by 
emphasizing the need to consider paranormal and religious involvement in 
studies of paranormal and religious beliefs (Benassi et al., 1979; Irwin, 1993; 
McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer & Griggs, 1989; Shrauger & Silverman, 
1971). Further, this research adds to past literature regarding probability 
judgments and errors in reasoning in relation to paranormal beliefs (Blackmore & 
Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et al., 1990, Dagnall et al., 
2007; Gray & Mill, 1990; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Sutherland, 1992; Wierzbicki, 
1985). In this research, participants who chose the psychic more often also 
overestimated the probability that a target's location could be predicted 
successfully. 
This research is theoretically important because it closes some gaps in the 
literature concerning religion and illusory judgment. Participants who were more 
religiously involved were less likely to choose the psychic. Further, religious 
involvement was negatively associated with perceived internal control. 
Although past researchers have stated that they were measuring control, 
some were actually measuring other illusory judgments (Presson & Benassi, 
1996); this research is among the only research to connect paranormal and 
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religious beliefs to illusory prediction. This research is also theoretically important 
regarding the relation between involvement, beliefs, and illusory judgments. Past 
research has not differentiated between personal and general involvement in 
terms of paranormal beliefs. This research has shown that personal paranormal 
involvement results in very different results compared to general paranormal 
involvement. Participants who were more personally involved chose the psychic 
less often, whereas participants who were more generally involved chose the 
psychic more often. 
In addition to theoretical implications, there are also implications for the 
area of gambling as well as everyday paranormal experiences. Use of a 
paranormal strategy (i.e., a "psychic" or, more likely, perceived personal psychic 
abilities) may lead some individuals to gamble beyond their means, especially if 
they believe that chance games are simply a matter of luck - a skill factor that 
can be improved or manipulated (Friedland, 1998; Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; 
Wohl & Enzle, 2002). Furthermore, during times of uncertainty (i.e., life seems 
unpredictable or during times of negative life experiences), people may be 
particularly vulnerable to individuals who claim to have psychic abilities such as 
psychic hotline operators or fortunetellers. Use of psychic hotlines and call 
numbers may not seem like an important facet of American life until one 
considers that the psychic industry earns well over a billion dollars every year 
(Nickel & Nisbett, 1998). Given the prevalence of religious and paranormal 
beliefs and the billion dollar industries that have sprung up to take advantage of 
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people's vulnerabilities based upon these beliefs, it is important that researchers 
study the errors in decision making that result from non-scientific beliefs. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL TASK/MEASURES 
Directions given to participants for experiment 
This is a card game. Your task will be to obtain the HIGHEST SCORE possible by 
CORRECTLY answering questions about hidden objects. 
For example, you will be presented with 8 hidden cards and asked to pick a RED card 
from the 8. You will also be given some information about the 8 cards. For example, "1 
of the 8 cards is a RED card." 
You are COMPETING against other individuals so it is IMPORTANT TO DO AS 
WELL AS YOU CAN. 
When we have given this task to others in the past we have found that people find it 
easier to occasionally follow the choices made by others. 
In this experiment, we placed an ad for a person who claimed to have the ability to know 
the correct card without seeing it. We tested this person's psychic abilities and found that 
this person was, in fact, quite good. 
The same questions that were asked of the psychic will now be asked of you. However, 
unlike the psychic, you may choose to use the psychic's answer instead of selecting a card 
yourself. 
If you choose the psychic's answer and the psychic was right then you will also be 
correct. If you choose the psychic's answer and the psychic was wrong then you will also 
be wrong. 
For each question, you will be given the same information as the psychic. You must then 
choose between the psychic's answer or select from one of the objects presented on your 
own. 
REMEMBER, YOU MUST TRY TO DO AS WELL AS YOU CAN. THIS IS A 
COMPETITION! 
There are 10 questions to complete in this section. Check off the correct box to indicate 
your answer. You must pick an object to move on to the next question. 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU READ EACH OF THE QUESTIONS THOROUGHLY. 
81 
Studv 3A: Disser tat 
1 . 1 of the 8 cards is a CLUB. You must pick a CUUB from the S cards presented OR 
choose the psychic's answer. 
B S B K H a S H H S I E H M a W : K 
CO) I choose trie psychic's selection 
£ ) , Card 1 
QjjCard 2 
O cara 3 
(~)i Card 4 
£)|Card 5 
( J j Card 6 
(~)i card 7 
(~^l Card S 
4. Question 2 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
1 . 1 of the 8 cases contains 1 million dollars. Please choose the correct case. 
5. Question 3 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
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Study 3A: Diss-"' 
1. Behind 1 of the 8 doors is a new LCD television. Choose the correct door. 
6. Question 4 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
1. 1 of the 8 cards is a Queen. Please choose a QUEEN. 
f j j I choose the psychic's selection 
f~>iCard 1 
O Card 2 
Q j C a r d 3 
(3 C8rd 4 
QiCard 5 
i Q Cord 6 
0 C a r d 7 
( ^ Card 8 
7. Question 5 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
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1.1 of the envelopes contains $1000. Please choose the correct envelope. 
[~\l choose the psychic's selection 
(/^Envelope 1 
C_\Envelope 2 
C_l Envelope 3 
f j h Envelope 4 
f " j5 Envelope 5 
\ / \ Envelope 6 
f J) Envelope 7 
CjdEnvelope 8 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
1. 1 of the 8 cards is a diamond. Please choose a DIAMOND. 
r j f j l choose the psychic's selection 
Q i C a r d l 
Q i card 2 
Q card 3 
QiCard 4 
Q Card 5 
(~\, Card 6 
Q j C a r d 7 
Q j Card 8 
Please choose the correct target object or rely onthepsychic's selection. 
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1. Behind 1 of the 8 doors is a new sportscar. Please choose the correct door. 
In mil iiliiil 
g Door 2 
k Door 3 
f j j I choose the psychic's selection 
QiOoor 1 
O 
( J i Door 4 
C j ; Door 5 
Q j D O O T S 
Q Door 7 
f j ] Door 8 
10. Question 3 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
1. 1 of the 8 suitcases contains $10,000. Please choose the correct suitcase. 
J? f i* L ^ j L~.2 I— It L-. 1J • 5 t Jr 
[ l i choose the psychic's selection 
( 3 Case 1 
C J j Case 2 
C 3 c a s e 3 
Q j i case 4 
r j j jCa ' se 5 





11. Question 9 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
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Study n i Q ^ p t - f p f i 
1.1 of the 8 cards is a spade. Please choose a SPADE, 
yjT"* WSmSt 
12. Question 10 
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection. 
1.1 of the 8 envelopes contains the keys to a new house. Please choose the correct 
envelope. 
C^Jl 1 choose the psychic's selection 
f~J| Envelope 1 
Q j Envelope Z 
f j l Envelope 3 
r / i Envelope 4 
r~)j Envelope 5 
("^Envelope 6 
r j h Envelope 7 
f j j Envelope B 
13. Probability 
1 





14. Questionnaire 1 
You have completed the guessing portion of the study. Mow we have some additional questions for you to answer. 
Please complete each of the questionnaires and assignments. TTiank you. 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something In between. 
1 . Claiming state benefits that you are not entitled to 
I R 
2. Avoiding a fare on public transport 
1 H 
3. Cheating on taxes if you have the chance 
4. Buying something you knew was stolen 
CZZE3 
5. Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding) 
6. Smoking marijuana 
7. Keeping money that you have found 
8. Lying in your own interest 
r—R 
9. Married men or women having an affair 
I R 
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Q Older than 52 
3. Where are you from? 
C } Northeast 




(~) Outside of the United States 
4. What is your education? 
f O Some or Completed Highschool 
f j Some College 
C~J Completed College 
C~J Some Graduate Education 
( _ ) Graduate degree (i.e., PhD, MA, MD, etc. . ) 
5. What is your religion? 
( 2 ) Catholic 
( J Christian (Protestant, Methodist, Baptist, etc...) 
C \ Evangelical Christian 
( _ ) Jewish 
( ~ ) Muslim 
(~J Buddhist 
Q Hindu 
( j Wiccan/Pagan 
Q Other 
Other (please specify) 
gg 
6. Have you ever used the following services? Please check ALL that apply. 
I I Tarot reading 
| | Palm reading 
| | Fortune reading 
I j Scrying (crystal ball) 
| I Handwriting analysis 
| | Dream analysis 
| | Medium services (communication with deceased) 
I I Ouija board 
Other psychic service 
Never used a psychic 
7. Have you ever performed any of the following services? Please check ALL that 
apply. 
I I Tarot reading 
I I Palm reading 
I I Fortune reading 
j [ Scrying (crystal ball) 
I I Handwriting analysis 
1 I Dream analysis 
| I Medium services 
| | Ouija board 
\ \ Other psychic service 
| | Never performed any of these 
8. Please rate your own psychic abilities on a scale of 1 ( I don't have any) to 10 (X 
am an excellent psychic). 
9. In the past year, how often have you engaged in gambling activities (i.e., playing 
cards for money, playing at a casino, etc...)? 
Q ; Never 
(^J Rarely (1 or 2 times a year) 
( " ) Occassionaily (3 or 4 times a year) 
( Y Moderately (every few months) 




10. If you gamble, where do you do it? Please check all that apply. 
| | At my own or a friend's house/apartment 
| | At the casino 
| | At a club/underground establishment 
| I On the internet 
| | I don't gamble 
11. What is the largest amount of money you have ever lost gambling? 
\~j I have never lost money 
C~) Between $ t and $50 
( _ ) Between $51 and $100 
QJ) Between $101 and $500 
Q Between $501 and $1000 
Q More than $1000 
12. What is the largest amount of money you have ever won_gambling? 
C_J I have never won money 
r ~ ) Between $1 and $50 
Q Between $51and $100 
( " ) Between $101 and $500 
( " j Between $501 and $1000 
Q More than $1000 
13. Finally, where did you learn about this survey? 
Thank you for completing this survey! Please hit the submit button to be taken to the debriefing/prize entry page. 
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1. Paranormal Belief Scale (Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977; modified by Presson & 
Benassi) 
Please read each of the following statements and indicate, using the following rating 
scale, the degree to which you agree or disagree with each one. 
1-
Strongfy Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1. It is likely that many phenomena such as ESP (Extra Sensory Perception) will 
one day be proven to exist. 
2. I believe that, at least on some occasions, I can read another person's mind 
through ESP. 
3. ESP is a gift that many people have, and should not be confused with the 
elaborate tricks used by entertainers. 
*4. All of the reports of scientific proof for the existence of psychic phenomena are 
sensationalism with no factual basis. 
5. With proper training anyone could learn to read other people's minds. 
6. Plants can sense the feelings of humans through a form of ESP. 
7. ESP has been scientifically proven to exist. 
8. I believe that psychic phenomena are real. 
9. Some people can make physical objects move or cause them to 
change shape by their powers of concentration. 
10. Some people have the power to bend objects (e.g., spoons) with only their 
thoughts. 
11. Some people have the ability to accurately predict the outcomes of dice throws. 
12. There may be some validity to psychic phenomena. 
13. With proper training, I could develop ESP. 
14. I believe that I have precognitive ability. 
15. I believe that I can project my thoughts to another person. 
* 16. The results of dice throwing depend entirely on chance. 
17. Some people can accurately visualize things before they happen. 
18. If I concentrate enough I could learn to bend objects (e.g., spoons) using only 
my thoughts. 
* 19. Premonitions never have a psychic basis to them. 
20. If I wanted to see what the future has in store for me, I could use tarot cards or 
an astrology chart. 
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2. Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales (Levenson, 1981) 
-3 strongly disagree -2 disagree -1 slightly disagree +1 slightly agree +2 agree +3 
strongly agree 
1. Whether or not I get to be leader depends mostly on my ability 
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. 
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I 
am. 
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck 
happenings. 
7. When I get what I want, it's usually because I am lucky. 
8. Although I mighty have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility 
without appealing to those in positions of power. 
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 
10.1 have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. 
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests 
when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups. 
14. It's not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to 
be a matter of good or bad fortune. 
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I am lucky enough to be in 
the right place at the right time. 
17. If important people were to decide they didn't like me, I probably wouldn't make 
many friends. 
18.1 can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 
19.1 am usually able to protect my personal interests. 
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. 
21. When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it. 
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of 
people who have power over me. 
23. My life is determined by own actions. 
24. It's chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends. 
3. The Religiousness Scale (Strayhorn, Weidman, & Larson, 1990). 
In areas that refer to "God" please insert the higher power for your own religion. 
1. How religious would you say you are? (Not at all, not very much, somewhat, 
pretty much, very much) 
2. How often do you study the Bible or other religious literature privately? (Never, 
seldom, occasionally, frequently [at least once a week, but not daily], daily) 
3. * Other than at mealtime, how often, on the average, do you pray to God 
privately? (Several times per day, daily, occasionally, seldom, never) 
4. *When you are tempted to something wrong, how often do you ask God for 
strength to do right? (Very often, often, sometimes, seldom, never) 
5. *When you have decisions to make, in your everyday life, how often do you ask 
yourself what God would want you to do, or ask God for help in making the 
decision? (Very often often, sometimes, seldom, never) 
6. On the average, how often have you attended religious worship services (i.e., 
Sunday morning, evening, and/or other days) during the last year? (Never, a few 
times a year, only on Holidays, once or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly, 
more than once a week) 
7. How much of your income do you donate per year to a church or religious 
organization? (None, a very small donation relative to my income, a small 
donation relative to my income, a medium donation relative to my income, a large 
donation relative to my income) 
8. How often do you serve a church or other religious organization in Sunday school 
teaching, church project leadership, or other responsibilities? (Never, a few times 
a year, once or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly, more than once a week) 
9. How would you describe the nature of your relationship to God? (No relationship 
or do not use the concept of God, distant relationship, between distant and close 
relationship, close relationship, very close relationship) 
10. How often do you experience or feel God's approval for some good act you have 
done? (Never, seldom, occasionally, often, very often) 
11. How often do you experience God's disapproval for some undesirable act you 
have done? (Never, seldom, occasionally, often, very often) 
12. To what extent are you conscious of some religious goal or purpose in life which 
serves to give direction to your life? (Not at all, to a small extent, to a moderate 
extent, to a large extent, to a very large extent) 
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APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL LETTERS 
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UNIVERSITY of NEW HAMPSHIRE 
April 29, 2008 
Erin Goforth 
Psychology 
Durham, NH 03824 
Study: Illusions of Prediction in Relation to Control as well as Religious and Paranormal 
Involvement 
Approval Date: 11/8/2007 
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b). 
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation. 
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.qov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR. 
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur. 
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee. 
For the IRB, 
K^pCUV 
impson' 
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564 
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UNIVERSITY of NEW HAMPSHIRE 
April 29, 2008 
Erin Goforth 
Psychology 
Durham, NH 03824 
Study: Illusions of Prediction in Relation to Control as well as Religious and Paranormal 
Involvement 
Approval Date: 02/22/2008 
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b). 
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation. 
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubtects/auidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR. 
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur. 
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee. 
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